File Name: iq and global inequality .zip
IQ is shown to be a powerful predictor of both these dependent variables, although not, of course, a monocausal explanation. By employing regression analysis, the authors isolate deviant data points, and try to explain why the individual countries they represent at these points in time deviated significantly from the expected trend-line values. Many of the IQ statistics on which they draw must inevitably be subject to significant errors, especially as data were available only for 81 out of the countries analysed, with the rest assigned IQs equal to, or averaging those of adjacent countries.
Still, the compilation is sufficiently massive to tolerate them in the interest of comprehensiveness. However, it is not only the IQ estimates used by the authors as the independent variable that are insecure, so too are the estimates of per capita GDP, particularly those relating to the 19th century.
Angus Maddison is an undeniably authoritative source for these. However, the historical data are based on nonmodern sources, emanating from an age when the concept of GDP or national income had yet to be formulated, so that many key components were altogether missing, and are sometimes proxied by borrowing from relationships displayed by underdeveloped economies of apparently similar structure and income, but at very different times in history.
In other words, they are only as valid as the assumptions fed into them. For example, 19th century data sets seldom yield useful data on the service sector. Moreover, the sort of statistics that can be picked up with a degree of reliability are those that reflected modernisation rather than traditional economic activity.
For example, rail transportation generated precise data, while volumes of goods and passengers transported by road were rarely collected, coal use may be known, but not that of firewood, large-scale industrial output is usually ascertainable, but not that of cottage industries, cereal output is picked up but seldom that of livestock products.
All these omitted traditional activities happened to be major contributors to income in relatively backward economies. Even the figures for advanced economies are approximate. For example, for Britain we have no secure agricultural statistics until the s, because the state did not collect them. And in many cases, even population figures were subject to wide margins of error. Thus the assumptions and proxies can dominate the data.
Consider the authors' regressions for In terms of labour productivity in farming, Allen's figures for England and the Yangtse are nearly identical, and if anything to the Chinese advantage. Of course these figures say nothing about productivity in industry, but they do suggest that the Maddison figures grotesquely overestimate the Britain—China gap at this time.
In the authors' Figure 7. The other big negative deviant is, interestingly, Japan. Yet, we know that Tokugawa Japan in — probably achieved impressive GDP per capita growth, despite its seclusion. This was partly as a result of population control, which prevented gains in agricultural productivity and the spread of cottage industry from being diluted by population growth, and Susan Hanley has suggested that in terms of mass living standards, early 19th century Japan did not fall much below England.
Maybe, but Russia was also, despite or possibly because of serfdom, a highly productive country, which by the carefully computed estimate of Ian Blanchard attained a per capita income in equal to that of Britain, and thus stood at the top of the World league table of that period.
Such a finding would not have surprised contemporaries who were aware not only of Russia's superrich aristocracy, but also of the coarse abundance enjoyed by its hard working and enterprising peasantry. Readjustment of these figures for China, Japan and Russia would transform the regression statistic, and provide massively positive evidence for the authors' central contention. I am not suggesting that the data should be revised in this way because it would be unscientific to tweak certain data points without revising them all.
An economic historian would, I think, tackle the problem through examining economic growth performance rather than absolute levels of per capita output, and try to isolate the contribution of IQ as one of several influences on performance. Neoclassical analysis would invite use of a variant of the much used Cobb—Douglas production function as a means of measuring the comparing change in total factor productivity TFP between economies.
TFP growth is the measure of change in the efficiency with which all factor inputs were used — after extracting the contributions to growth made by increments to resources, capital and labour.
This is because per capita GDP has inevitably been influenced by the relative abundance of natural resources real estate and subsoil wealth and of the value of the national capital stock of accumulated wealth, while change in per capita GDP would have been influenced by incremental change in natural resources, capital accumulation and change in the labour force participation rate.
Most obviously, the TFP measure should sift out the effects on growth of output of, say, fossil fuel and mineral discoveries, the opening up of abundant fertile land, or a high domestic savings schedule, factors which have clearly accounted historically for a significant part of the difference between the wealth of nations.
For example in 19th century Europe, where national IQ differences have been small, natural resource endowments played a significant role in determining relative output levels and performance. The nature of 19th century technological change placed a premium on disposing abundant coal types suitable for metallurgical purposes and raising steam, preferably in association with high-grade iron ore, and farmland with an orographic balance capable of sustaining nitrogen fixing crops.
This showed up in relatively low output and growth in southern Europe. However, in the medium run, central planning systems applied in the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia after World War II, although inefficient, were probably growth inducing for an extended period from the s to s. In manufacturing technology, easy gains could be secured by forced industrialisation, if backed up with a massive effort in training engineers, and the rigorous suppression of consumption.
During this period, Yugoslavia probably achieved the highest economic growth in Europe. However, in the mid s, systems of this type ceased to deliver fast growth, and the mechanisms needed to adapt to market-based economics were not implemented.
Among minor errors, China's precocious medieval experiment in paper money p. In the s, widely circulating Monte di Pieta banknotes were officially accepted as cash by the Neapolitan state, the Swedish authorities circulated Riksdaler banknotes from , and goldsmith notes began to circulate at about the same time in England. The output of subsistence farming is, contrary to the authors' claim, picked up in historical GDP statistics.
And when discussing causes of Britain's relative growth retardation relative to Germany in the late 19th century p. Despite the limitations of their statistical databases and methods, Lynn and Vanhanen have launched a powerful challenge to economic historians and development economists, who prefer not to use IQ as an analytical input. It is likely therefore that this work will be studiously ignored, whereas it urgently needs to be refined and built upon. Reprints and Permissions.
Palairet, M. IQ and the Wealth of Nations. Heredity 92, — Download citation. Published : 24 March Issue Date : 01 April Journal of Biosocial Science Environmental Research British Journal of Health Psychology Advanced search. Skip to main content Thank you for visiting nature. Download PDF. Additional information Reviewed by MR Palairet. Rights and permissions Reprints and Permissions.
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The global food system has changed rapidly over recent decades, with large shifts in agricultural supply conditions, international trade, food manufacturing and nutrient availability. These shifts have contributed to both positive and negative impacts on health and wellbeing with some countries catching up while others have fallen further below international norms. We aim to quantify long-run changes in the food supply and diet-related health disparities across countries, to illustrate how inequality has changed from the s to the s. We used techniques from economics Lorenz curves, Gini coefficients, and Pen's Parade to generate novel visualizations and metrics for global inequality and disparities in national food supply and diet-related health outcomes across countries. We computed global inequality in food supplies as available dietary energy from all fruits and vegetables, all animal source foods, and all foods other than starchy staples, and inequality in diet-related outcomes such as overweight and obesity, underweight, stunting, raised blood pressure, and diabetes.
Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. Lynn and T. Lynn , T. Vanhanen Published Psychology. They showed that these IQs correlated around 0.
The book was published by Washington Summit Publishers , a white nationalist and eugenicist publishing group. Lynn and Vanhanen's research on national IQs has attracted widespread criticism of the book's scores, methodology, and conclusions. In IQ and Global Inequality Lynn and Vanhanen argue that intelligence, as measured by IQ tests, is a major contributor to national wealth as well as to various measures of social well-being.
PDF | On Jan 1, , R Lynn and others published IQ and global inequality | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate.
Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, , pp. This and many other vivid examples of individuals and communities struggling to combat poverty and ill health around the world demonstrate the sense of outrage that drove the authors of Dying for Growth to attempt an exposition of the assumption that economic growth is good for all. This collection of case studies provides ample illustration for the rush of academic papers that have begun to observe that, whilst health, on the average, has improved during the twentieth century, disparities between population groups are increasing at the expense of the poor. Despite extraordinary wealth and technological developments, millions of poor people die unnecessarily. The argument lacks the familiarity of the quantitative format but the carefully reasoned country studies demonstrate that economic growth, far from being a panacea, often accelerates the suffering of poor and marginalized people. In Peru, a woman chooses to live with tuberculosis in the face of escalating costs of private health care, whilst her policy-makers tighten their belts under the pressures of external debt. With the introduction of its market economy, there is growing concern in Russia about decreased birth rates, low life expectancy and increased male mortality.
We investigate the effect of intelligence on total factor productivity TFP using cross section data for countries over the period Alfaro, L. FDI, productivity and financial development. The World Economy Belasen, A. IQ and alcohol consumption: International data.
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